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Brailsford: South Carolina Green Party v. South Carolina State Election Commi

SOUTH CAROLINA GREEN PARTY V.
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION

South Carolina, like many other states, has what is commonly called a "soreloser" statute, which prohibits a candidate who loses a party primary from
appearing on the ballot in the general election as that party's candidate. But
South Carolina also allows individuals to run as "fusion candidates," which are
candidates who appear as the nominee of at least two certified political parties on
the general election ballot.2 Under the practice called electoral fusion, these
fusion candidates receive all the votes cast for them in the general election, in
their capacities as nominees for individual parties combined.3 In other words,
the votes follow the person, not the party. Even so, should a would-be fusion
candidate lose the nomination contest for any of its intended parties, the soreloser statute would appear to bar that candidate's name from appearing on the
general election ballot for any of its intended parties. 4
Last year, in South Carolina Green Party v. South CarolinaState Election

Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a
district court decision in favor of the defendants, a group consisting of the South
Carolina State Election Commission, members thereof, and the Charleston
County Democratic Party.5 The plaintiffs in the case, the South Carolina Green
Party; its 2008 nominee for South Carolina House Seat 115, Eugene Platt; and
Robert Dunham, a citizen-supporter of Platt, asserted that the sore-loser statute
violated the Green Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
6
association.
In 2008, Platt filed to run for South Carolina House Seat 115, representing
Charleston County. Platt sought the nomination of three political parties, filing
statements of intent with the South Carolina Democratic Party on March 17,
2008, the South Carolina Working Families Party on March 27, and the South
Carolina Green Party on May 3. The Green Party chose Platt as its nominee at
its state convention on May 3, and one week later, the Working Families Party
also selected Platt as its nominee. 9 On June 10, however, "Platt lost the
Democratic Party election."10 After Platt lost the Democratic primary, the South
Carolina Election Commission informed him that the state's sore-loser statute
prohibited him from appearing on the general election ballot as the nominee of
either the Green Party or the Working Families Party."
The Election
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S.C. CODE ANN. §7-11-10 (Supp. 2010).
S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 612 F.3d 752, 754 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id.
See § 7-11-10.
S.C. GreenParty, 612 F.3d at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 754.
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Commission based its decision on the section of the statute that prohibits the
name of anyone "who was defeated as a candidate for nomination to an office in
a party primary or party convention" from appearing on the subsequent general
or special election ballot. 12
Though Platt's complaint stems from his participation in the 2008 election
cycle, his challenge to the sore-loser statute is not moot because its alleged
burden on association rights is potentially recurring, or "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." 13 The plaintiffs contended that their case warranted strict
scrutiny review because of the severe burden the statute imposed on their right to
associate and because the statute lacked narrow tailoring to advance a
compelling
overnment interest-in this case, "minimizing excessive
factionalism."
The defendants responded that the statute advanced several
important regulatory interests, thereby justifyin the modest burden it potentially
imposed on a political party's right to associate.
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under § 198316 and injunctive
relief to stop the Election Commission, its members, and the Charleston County
Democratic Party from enforcing the statute.
The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion for
declaratory and injunctive relief, upholding the constitutionality of the sore-loser
statute as applied to Platt's Green Party application to appear on the ballot in the
2008 election.18 The plaintiffs appealed, focusing on Platt's Green Party
candidacy and emphasizing that he had already "successfully secured" that
nomination before running in the Democratic Party primary election. 19 The
plaintiffs' appeal addressed only the party members' collective right of
association, not Platt's individual right.2 0 In doing so, the plaintiffs argued that
the operation of the statute effectively allowed the voters in the Democratic Party
primary to "veto" the Green Party nominee by preventing a chosen primary
candidate from appearing on the general election ballot, while also stopping the
Green Party from electing a replacement candidate. 2 1 The defendants disagreed,
instead blaming the absence of Platt's name from the general election ballot on
Platt's own decision to run in the Democratic primary.

12. Id. at 754-55 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-10 (Supp. 2010)).
13. Id. at 754 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 755. "[A] faction ... [is] a number of citizens ... who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
15. S.C. GreenParty, 612 F.3d at 755.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
17. S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 647 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (D.S.C.
2009).
18. Id. at 617-18.
19. S.C. GreenParty, 612 F.3d at 755.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Writing for the majority, Judge Keenan, joined by Senior Judge Hamilton
and Samuel G. Wilson, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation,2 3 affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants and held (1) that the burden the sore-loser statute
imposed on the plaintiffs was not severe enough to merit strict scrutiny and (2)
that the statute advanced important state regulatory objectives. 24 The court
began with a brief survey of case law regarding the First Amendment right to
associate as applied to the states in the context of political elections and followed
it with a description of the appropriate test and standard for a constitutional
inquiry. 2 5 After this introduction, the court addressed the severity of the burden
that the statute imposed on the Green Party's right to choose its own candidate
and the legitimacy of the state interests that the statute purportedly advanced. 26
Finally, the court considered the effect of electoral fusion and the state's "party
loyalty" statute. 27
As applied to the political process, the right to associate "protects the rights
of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and ideas" 28
and "the freedom for individuals to 'band together' in political parties to promote
electoral candidates who support their political views" ;29 in other words, the
right to associate allows individuals to "choose their 'standard bearer' in the
form of a nominee." 30
In determining whether a state election law
unconstitutionally burdens an individual's right to associate, a court "must weigh
the character and magnitude of the burden . . . against the interests the State

contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's
concerns make the burden necessary." 31 The Supreme Court has stressed the
effectiveness of sore-loser statutes in minimizing "intra-party feuding," in saving
"'major struggles' for general election ballots,"3 and in preventing the "splinter"
of major political parties. 33 In Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld
California's sore-loser statute,3 4 which the Fourth Circuit has previously found to
be "substantially identical" to South Carolina's. 3 5 The Fourth Circuit upheld the

23. Id. at 754.
24. Id. at 759.
25. Id. at 755-56.
26. Id. at 756-59.
27. Id. at 760 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §7-11-210 (Supp. 2010)).
28. Id. at 755-56 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
29. Id. at 756 (quoting Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)).
30. Id. (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)).
31. Id. (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. (citing and quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)).
33. Id. (citing Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 596 (2005)).
34. Storer, 415 U.S. at 736.
35. S.C. Green Party,612 F.3d at 756 (quoting Backus v. Spears, 677 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir.
1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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South Carolina sore-loser statute in an earlier challenge as a "justifiable
measure[] for preventing splintering and factionalism within the major parties." 36
Next, the court analyzed the burden imposed by the sore-loser statute on the
Green Party's right to select a nominee of its choosing. The court disagreed with
the plaintiffs' contention that the sore-loser statute imposed a burden similar to
that of a California election law regarding "blanket" primary elections that the
Supreme Court invalidated.37 The California law allowed voters of any party to
vote in the primary election of any other party and thus potentially manipulate
the intention of an associated group and their right to associate.38 The court did
conclude, however, that a Minnesota ban on electoral fusion that the Supreme
Court upheld was comparable to the present case, in that although the challenged
Minnesota laws could keep a person's name from appearing on the general
election ballot as nominee for more than one party, they did "not restrict the
ability of the [party] and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone,"
and left the party "'free to try to convince' its nominee to refrain from seeking
the nomination of another political party." 39
The court held that South Carolina's sore-loser statute, like the Minnesota
electoral fusion ban, did not severely burden the Green Party's association
rights.40 Platt's decision to seek the nomination of more than one party, and not
the interference of the Democratic primary voters, ultimately undermined his
general election bid.41 The Green Party was not severely burdened in selecting a
candidate of its choice because it could have tried to convince Platt not to seek a
competing nomination.42 Furthermore, despite the plaintiffs' contention that the
sore-loser statute's disqualification of Platt left them without the ability to
nominate a substitute, the court found that the party could have nominated a
substitute candidate after Platt's loss. 43 As such, the party was only burdened to
the extent that it could not have its first-choice candidate on the ballot, not so
severely burdened that the party would be eliminated from the ballot.4 The
court held that this burden was not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny.45
The court next turned to the state interests that the sore-loser statute
purportedly advanced, and noted that "[w]hen ... a statute places only a modest
burden on association rights, 'a State's important regulatory interests will usually

36. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d 819, 825 (4th Cir.
1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)).
38. See id. at 757 (citing Cal DemocraticParty,530 U.S. at 577).
39. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351, 360, 363 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 759.
44. See id.
45. Id.
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be enough to justify its reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."' 46 In
addition to the previously recognized important regulatory interest of preventing
party splintering, the court also cited the desirable government objectives of (1)
reducing voter confusion likely to occur when a candidate who lost the primary
election appears on the general election ballot and (2) "ensuring orderly, fair, and
efficient procedures for the election of public officials."47 In so holding, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that splintering the Democratic Party was
not an issue because Platt sought the Green Party nomination prior to losing the
Democratic nomination. 4 8 Instead the court reasoned that Democratic party
voters who supported Platt could still vote for him in the general election and
thereby splinter the party.49 The court held that these im ortant regulatory
objectives justified the modest burden that the statute imposed.
Last, the court observed that electoral fusion did not change its analysis of
the Green Party's association rights because it "[did] not in any respect limit a
political party's association rights to choose its nominee."51 Additionally, the
court held that the plaintiffs' separate challenge to the state election law
commonly referred to as the "party loyalty" statute was rendered moot by the
court's holding regarding the sore-loser statute.52
Historically, the two major political parties have largely dominated elections
in the United States. However, the political climate in America may lead to
growing dissatisfaction with the two-party system and, as a result, strengthen
third parties and powerful factions, such as the Tea Party, within the existing
parties. Should the Tea Party or another group like it decide to break from its
major party and establish a certified third party, election laws like the sore-loser
statute could become increasingly important.
Regardless of whether party splintering is desirable, the state objectives of
reducing voter confusion and ensuring efficient and fair election procedures as
discussed in this case will continue to be vitally important to the health and
advancement of our society.
Susanna C. Brailsford

46. Id. (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).

47. Id.
48.

Id.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §7-11-210 (Supp. 2010)).
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